Class: UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallers

Defined in: cct/evm/lockbox/operations/update-authorized-callers.ts:49

Applies authorized-caller updates on an ERC20LockBox via applyAuthorizedCallerUpdates.

Extends

• EVMOperation<UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams>

Constructors

Constructor

new UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallers(): UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallers

Returns

UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallers

Inherited from

EVMOperation<UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams>.constructor

Properties

name

readonly name: "updateLockboxAuthorizedCallers" = 'updateLockboxAuthorizedCallers'

Defined in: cct/evm/lockbox/operations/update-authorized-callers.ts:50

camelCase id; matches the token-manager facade method and error context.

Overrides

EVMOperation.name

Methods

buildUnsigned()

protected buildUnsigned(chain: EVMChain, __namedParameters: UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams): Promise<UnsignedEVMTx>

Defined in: cct/evm/lockbox/operations/update-authorized-callers.ts:91

Confirms lockbox really is a deployed, supported ERC20LockBox and, when sender is known, that it owns the lockbox; then builds applyAuthorizedCallerUpdates calldata targeting it.

Parameters

Parameter	Type
chain	EVMChain
__namedParameters	UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams

Returns

Promise<UnsignedEVMTx>

Remarks

The pre-flight (assertLockbox) comes first because the failure it catches is silent: applyAuthorizedCallerUpdates sent to an EOA or an undeployed address executes no code and mines successfully, so without the read this op returns a confirmed tx hash for an authorization that never happened, and the pool's first lockOrBurn is what finally reverts UnauthorizedCaller. It also gates the owner read, since owner() is not a type check.

Throws

CCTParamsInvalidError if nothing at lockbox answers typeAndVersion(), or sender is given and is not the lockbox owner

Throws

CCTContractTypeInvalidError if lockbox is some other contract, e.g. the pool

Throws

CCTContractVersionUnsupportedError if it reports an unsupported version

Throws

CCIPTypeVersionInvalidError if lockbox answers typeAndVersion() with a string that is not a type version pair

Overrides

EVMOperation.buildUnsigned

---

execute()

execute(chain: EVMChain, params: EVMExecuteParams<UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams>): Promise<TransactionResult>

Defined in: cct/evm/operation.ts:150

generate, then sign and submit; returns the confirmed tx hash.

Parameters

Parameter	Type
chain	EVMChain
params	EVMExecuteParams<UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams>

Returns

Promise<TransactionResult>

Inherited from

EVMOperation.execute

---

generate()

generate(chain: EVMChain, params: UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams): Promise<UnsignedEVMTx>

Defined in: cct/evm/operation.ts:110

Run prepare and buildUnsigned, applying optional sender; no signing.

Parameters

Parameter	Type
chain	EVMChain
params	UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams

Returns

Promise<UnsignedEVMTx>

Remarks

Also pins every built transaction to chain.network.chainId (no RPC, known at construction). This is the one point every CCT builder and both execute paths pass through; unpinned, ethers would infer the chain from the eventual signer's provider.

Inherited from

EVMOperation.generate

---

parse()

protected parse(params: UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams): UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams

Defined in: cct/operation.ts:42

Normalize validated params for the builder — defaults, conversions, derived values. Identity by default, so an op that needs no normalization declares nothing.

Parameters

Parameter	Type
params	UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams

Returns

UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams

Inherited from

EVMOperation.parse

---

prepare()

protected prepare(params: UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams): UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams

Defined in: cct/operation.ts:48

validate then parse — the single pre-RPC step, before any chain access.

Parameters

Parameter	Type
params	UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams

Returns

UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams

Inherited from

EVMOperation.prepare

---

resolveWalletSender()

protected resolveWalletSender(wallet: unknown, sender?: string): Promise<string>

Defined in: cct/evm/operation.ts:130

Resolves the address a signed submission is authorized against: the signing wallet's own. The chain gates on msg.sender, and submit clears any builder-set tx.from before populating the tx (so ethers' own from/signer guard never fires) — an explicit sender that differs from the wallet would therefore let an op's pre-tx checks authorize one address while a different one actually signs, passing every local guard and reverting on-chain. Ops that gate on an on-chain role call this from execute; build with generateUnsigned* instead when the eventual signer isn't known yet, where sender is trusted as given.

Parameters

Parameter	Type
wallet	unknown
sender?	string

Returns

Promise<string>

Throws

CCIPWalletInvalidError if wallet is not a valid signer

Throws

CCTParamsInvalidError if sender is given and is not the wallet's address

Inherited from

EVMOperation.resolveWalletSender

---

validate()

protected validate(__namedParameters: UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams): void

Defined in: cct/evm/lockbox/operations/update-authorized-callers.ts:53

Validates the lockbox and every caller address; requires at least one caller.

Parameters

Parameter	Type
__namedParameters	UpdateLockboxAuthorizedCallersParams

Returns

void

Overrides

EVMOperation.validate